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Pam Parrish
Stretched Blue
With failing eyes my grandma sat reading her newspaper,
putting up with the bickering and antagonistic dialogue that
composes the majority of the exchanges between my grandpa
and myself In no tone in particular, and yet quite matter-of-factly, she mentioned that the last time she had seen a living bluebird in her elaborate garden--or anywhere-was in 1968. It flew
straight into her picture window and died on the spot. Instinct?
Grandma has a cat who is a very good hunter. This cat regularly brings many small-game prizes into the house for grandma-including birds. This is a cat's instinct. These war-torn
offerings are disposed of regularly and without ce!emony.
Without thinking much about it, however, grandma gave
this particular kamikaze bluebird of 1968 to her neighbor lady
the school teacher, thinking the bird might make an fun subject
for the teacher's ~rade school class to draw or paint. ((Yes!" the
school teacher agreed, "What a wonderful idea!" She prom pdy
put the bluebird into her kitchen freezer for safe keeping.
Instinct?
The discovery of this icy memorial later caused general
disease and agitation among the school teacher's own alreadygrown children who doubted the propriety of such preserving
practices. The school teacher had lost the nerve to dispose of
the bluebird entirely; her children insisted that, short of complete disposal, at the very least and in the name of decency, the
existence of the tiny frozen corpse must be kept secret from
the school teacher's aging mother. Yes, discretion is required if
one is compelled to keep a bluebird next to a chicken in a
freezer.

Some twenty-odd years later my grandma came across a
photograph of a bluebird which reminded her of how long it
had been since she her~elf had seen one, recalling of course that
last kamikaze bluebird of 1968. Using the photograph as a
model, grandma made a small oil painting of a bluebird, saying
she did not want to forget what a bluebird looked like. She hung
the painting in one of her two spare bedrooms-the one that has
always been yellow, as opposed to the one that has always been
blue.
Since my sisters and I were kids, the yellow bedroom has
always been free of all monsters, specters, or ghouls of any
sort-within the yellow walls we could safely read the tales of
the brothers Grimm, the hair raising Readers Digest "Dramas in
Real Life," even the Children's Bible without losing a moment to
thoughts of mortal danger.
It was the blue room that held all of the evil predators of
childhood-anything that could cause you to die before you
should wake was there, hidden-conveniently, under-the-bed.
In particular, there were multitudes of skeletons under there:
skeletons of brides, of Jesus, Hitler, of the still-living, yet very
bony, Johnny Cash, and of Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce
Indians. These skeletons could strike even during the daylight
hours, as the blue bedroom was also a sewing room and often
hid needles and pins primed to target little feet as victims-the
blue room always stayed cooler than the rest of the house as it's
windows rested in shade. If we needed to torture grandpa we
would either put Red Hots in his dinner salad or put him in the
blue room.
In our late teens we discovered that our (boy' cousins,
whom we rarely saw, had developed the same theories regarding
the blue room quite independently of out influence. Instinct.
The bluebird-in-oils got the yellow room.

It goes without saying that sleeping in the blue room' was a
ludicrous proposal. Only under an extreme circumstance of
duress or a gripping craving for an adrenaline fix would such
reckless behavior ever be elicited. Supreme initiation rites would
of course be held in the blue room-I was given a mohawk in
the blue room. Instinct.
For sleeping and dreaming I still choose the yellow room
today. Instinct. I like looking at the painting of the bluebird. My
instinct tells me to memorize its contours. It is hard to remember
something which you don't recall ever having had actually seen in
conscious memory. It wasn't until I saw the painting of the bluebird that I realized I had never actually seen one. I thought I had.
After all, I myself dressed as a Bluebird once a week for three years
of my life. My mother was a Bluebird leader. I chose Bluebirds
over Brownies solely on the basis of the uniform aesthetic-I was
into it, I knew what a Bluebird was to look like.
So yes, I was a BlueQird without knowing what a bluebird
was, and then I became a Campfire ... w~en all of the smoke settled at the end of many circling roads, I astonishingly hit the
front door of the Honors Building. I was looking for a way
around the BK Broiler general requirement Blue Room of higher education. I followed my instincts against training and probability. I found within a Yellow Room made of ancient tableaux,
of voices which have escaped escaping the collective memory.
Sometimes events manifest themselves in a certain order,
causing extraordinary actions outside of our daily compounded
existence-new possibilities present themselves and old boundaries can be negotiated, adapted, to accommodate and to facilitate a changing form. Maybe it takes time. The contours of
time felt by instinct. What will I do with my education? I don't
know how t9 tell now when .it will be over, done, and ready.
I would like to pass through the window and keep on flying.
I'd like to avoid the secret deception of the freezer.

Stop Making Me Laugh,
Can't You See I'm Dying Here?
The Phaedo comprises one speech. This speech is delivered
in the form of a war; a war that wonders about and is fought
over the existence of the soul after the death of the body. Does
the soul here perish, or is it truly immortal? The life or death
of the soul becomes in this sense the prize of the war-the
underlying cause, the quest for knowledge of the Truth. Thus,
the side that presents the prevailing theory of the soul receives,
not only the honor of possessing the answer to this long and
much-sought after question, but also the further honour of
possessing the truth about reality, and therefore, an overall hold
on Truth itself.
The war is fashioned in two parts, as a remake in form of
the Homeric epic poems, the Iliad and the Odyssey, respectiveIy.I Both of these poems themselves comprise what is described
by Beye as the base structure of tragedy, which follows a threepart format beginning with the hamartia, (human frailty), followed by the metabole, (reversal) and finally, the anagnorisis,
(realization) (Beye, 138). Although the two poems-as well as
the two corresponding halves of the speech in the Phaedo--do
share this structure that has been named tragic, it would be
wrong to carry this to mean that the Odyssey shares the same
tragic tone as the Iliad.
For the purposes of this explication, the distinction between
the tragic tone of the Iliad contrasted to the comic tone of the
Odyssey is a crucial one to make. That this distinction does
indeed exist is demonstrated by an ancient author, who used the
1. From a lecture by Lawrence Wheeler, winter of 1995.
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Greek word komikos, comedy, to <!ifferentiate the Odyssey from
the Iliad (Beye, 174). Beye sees early elements of comedy
emerging in Euripides' late works, including the Ion. He compares the distinctive comedic features of the narrative of the Ion
to those of the Odyssey, and finds them to be parallel, stating
that this parallelism, (( .. .lends support to the view that the
Homeric epics derive from two entirely different sensibilities,
tragic and comic. Into the second of these categories fall[s] the
Odyssej' (Beye, 189).
The Phaedo opens with Phaedo himself describing an
absolutely incomprehensible emotion on the day of Socrates'
execution; a sort of curious l?Iend of pleasure and pain combined, between laughing and crying (59). Socrates' first lines in
the dialogue are in reference to the queer, dose relationship that
exists between pleasure and pain; a theme he goes on to develop
and repeat (60b-c), forming a strong portent of things to come.
Deepening the .insight into the integral relationship between
tragedy and comedy, as is useful here, Beye offers that a philosopher might describe a tragedy as a verbal construct of the reality
that surrounds us (132). He later asserts that tragedies were a
thoroughly political institution in the Classical period, and that
the comic theater, having an equal political status, served to discuss those tragedies (175). In this light, the comedy functions
not only to reiterate the events of history, but it attempts to give
applicable meaning and purpose to them--comedy becomes at
once a reworking, a mirror, and a conscience for past events,
which have been depicted in the form of tragedy.
These combined notions form an integral element in looking at the Phaedo. Firstly, the self-conscious relationship of
tragedy and comedy serves to accurately illustrate the commonly held view of the function of the Odyssey as an absorption of, and an answer to, the overwhelming anxieties inherent
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in the relationship between man and the gods in the Iliad-a
relationship that left man inextricably vulnerable to the apathetic and often malevolent whimsy of the gods and the
unbending wills of fate. The Odyssey offered refuge and hope to
a man in this predicament: by use of his intellect, and by controlling his emotions, he could escape the crushing contrivances of the gods and lend a hand in shaping his own destiny.
This pattern is profoundly realized in the movement of the
Phaedo: in the first half of the speech, the conflict is clearly delineated between the ideals of the true philosopher and anyone who
is not a philosopher: namely, the ccSophist"-a term that comes
to be used in Greek history as a sort of catch-all which could
expand to include the city, its politics, and the irrational thought
that Socrates believed to be the plague of mankind. The second
half of the speech cradles this conflict; soothing, insisting, and
lamenting that the two sensibilities cannot coexist without contaminating and destroying one or the other and that the only
moral and 'soul-saving' choice one' has is to follow the life of philosophy-in other words, to use the intellect to save the individual body, as well as that of the city, from its own Sophist
thought. Of course the self-conscious nature of the dialogue is
readily apparent: Socrates, the philosopher, has been condemned
to death by the city of Athens-which, by extension of those
who control its politics, he considers to be the embodiment of
Sophist thought in operation. The irony at work here is that the
city has rejected Socrates and his philosophy for their combined
attacks on its belief system; he has been charged and sentenced
to execution for impieties committed toward the city. Socrates'
only recourse at this point is to re-apply the old formula of
comedic assessment--he must now rely on his philosophical
intellect to save the life of his soul.
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The relationship between tragedy and comedy thus elicits
an evolution in cultural beliefs; by first recounting an event, and
the~ analyzing its outcome. The outcome of this analysis is then
dumped into the cultural belief system. Each time this
'comedic' process repeats itself, it chooses only the beliefs and
the factual references that are essential to continuing the present
level of thought. If an idea is no longer congruent with the current shift of belief, the idea is stripped of its truth value,
ridiculed, and deemed myth; thus, deleted from the working
belief system. In this way, the cultural corpus evolves-veering
ever farther from the initial premise, or belief system, and correlating directly to large-scale cultural shifts: as the Odyssey
reworked the Iliadic relationship of man and the gods, so
evolved the real-life emergence of the Greek individual from the
family. Later Greek culture applied those same Homeric lessons:
first, to the new 'family' of the emerging city, and next, to the
emerging individual within that city-forever furthering the
ideas of the tragic reality and the comedic solution, as well as
furthering man from his initial roots.
Here rests the paradox of the Phaedo: any historical event or
belief system that enters into this cycle of cultural evolution,
itself becomes myth. Rational thought was discrediting myth's
legitimacy, by degrees changing the shape of the cultural corpus.
This meant that the future was being formed on a rationale that
completely discredited the past; rendering obsolete the very
foundation on which the rationale itself was based. Beye illustrates this in saying, "Myth's suggestiveness also clashed with the
prevailing intellectual temper, which was moving toward logic,
categories, and all other tools of the practicing philosopher.
Myth allows for illogicalities to be resolved in a way impossible
to the intellectual mind" (167). This culmination provides a
strong beginning account of Socrates' complete antipathy for the
156

cultural corpus during the course of the dialogue: at each and
every turn he refutes, belittles, and vehemently denies its legitimacy.
It is extremely ironic then, that the speech of the Phaedo-whose content intrinsically condemns the cultural corpus in all
of its manifestations-presents itself in the literary mythic format which defines that system. In this way, the speech at once
illustrates the problem, is the problem, and refutes that problem:
the paradox of history realized. The image of Socrates at the
opening of the dialogue: daybreak in the center of the city,
Socrates lay, imprisoned there, like his figurative soul within his
body (59d). Socrates began, saying that any man would be quite
willing to die if he were properly grounded in philosophy. As he
spoke he lowered his feet to the ground, remaining in this position for the rest of the discussion (61 d). Man is still the puny figure at the mercy of uncontrollable forces, only now, with the aid
of the intellect, and its manifest philosophy, the direct conflict
between man and god is several times removed~ What was the
price paid for this pseudo-security blanket? Man abandoned the
exposed environs of the countryside, man denied bewildering
consort with the flesh, Socrates drank the hemlock: this is the
point at which the mythic war of the Phaedo begins.
The war of this speech is divided into individual battles of
question and debate. It is within this construct that the individual points of the argument are made and fought. The first Iliadic
half of the war features Socrates the Philosopher in the role of the
epic hero Achilles. The Thebans - Simmias and Ceb~ - provide the opposing Trojan faction, representing the Sophistshence the city-in this case Athens.
There are three ascending instanc~ of question and debate
in this Iliadic representation, in keeping with the three-part base
structure of tragedy. There is the hamartia (60c-78), in which
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Socrates is taunted into battle by both Thebans, then urged on
by his fellow Athenian Crito. Socrates plunges in, taking on first
Simmias, then Cebes, then Simmias again; finally, he faces both
Thebans at once: the battle line is drawn, culminating in a dramatic squaring off between philosophy and rhetoric. Next follows the metabole (78-84b): Socrates and Cebes are grappling
one on one, Socrates is winning easily, then suddenly, he pauses;
here Socrates-unlike his predecessor, Achilles-realizes that, in
the face of these assaults, on his sensibilities, the only hope for
truly winning this battle lies in his ability to exercise his reason
over his appetitive lust for blood. Now, the anagnorisis (84c88b): Socrates quickly turns cunning, taunting his opponents
playfully, making light of both Apollo and Orpheus (84d); allthe-while himself lapsing into the role of accommodating host to
the bereaved-then lingering for a moment of shared doom,2
amicably inviting both Thebans to stake their claims. This transformation of attitude is made complete in the unforgettable
image of Socrates pretending to be dazzled by the Thebans' combined stratagems: ((Socrates opened his eyes very wide-a
favorite trick of his-and smiled (86d)."
The battle schemata alternate throughout from instances of
quick, stichic lines of narrative employed to indicate moments of
all-out, hand-to-hand combar3 to slower, intermediary intervals
of Homeric battle taunting, squaring off between the opponents,
and the deepening advancements of Socrates' argument for the
immortality of the soul. It is here, in' the lines of question and
debate, that the war of words is fought.
The battles of question and debate provide the same functions in the second, Odyssean, portion of the speech. It begins
2. Homer, Iliad, 24.570-24.697. Priam and Achilles share their respective losses
and ill-fate.
3. "Stichomythy usually involves competition or conflict and is thus very much in
keeping with the nature of tragic drama" (Beyet 133).
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with the hamartia (89b-95e), in which the fully metamorphosed
Socrates emerges as the self-composed Odysseus, man of many
wiles. Phaedo bleeds out of the narrative frame and into' the
action as playing Iolaus to Socrates' Heracles (89c),4 receiving
fatherly warnings from Socrates about the dangers of becoming
misologic in the same way that people become misanthropic: by
beli~ing in somebody quite uncritically (89d). This is the
smoke screen and fair-warning Socrates issues as he launches into
his many disguises. Quickly, Socrates reasserts his firm philosophical stance through his discourse with Phaedo and, wasting
no time, he softens the Theban attack by launching into a fullfledged comic rendition: making himself seem ridiculous and
harmless as one of the laughable and bumbling old marathonio~
saying how selfish he is, an intellectual invalid, giving into selfpity (91b), and once again, the warning: "You must not allow
me, in my enthusiasm, to deceive both myself and you, and leave
my sting behind when I flyaway" (91c)5 The Thebans fall into
the false sense of security; Socrates' new, gentle tones bring them
immediately wagging to his side.
At this point, Simmias' theory quickly falls VIctIm to
Socrates' clever and precise advancements. Next it's Cebes' turn:
Socrates, increasing in intensity, yet maintaining his gentle ruse,
enters into an account of his personal path into philosophy. As
Socrates describes the disappointments and deceptions he met
along the way, he slowly actualizes the experience of Odysseus:
the careful compilation of lies sooner or later defines the silhouette of its counterpart; the dialogue becomes Socrates' Odyssean6
4. Wehsters Encyt/opedic U1lflbridged Dictionary. Iolaus. the nepheW and trusted
companion of Heraeles).
5. Beye discusses the marathonioi from Aristophanes' Wasps: "Their strength and
ferocity have become irascibility, petty nastiness. and grumbling, represented by
ther, wasps' stingers" (Beye. 183).
6. The point at which Odysseus tells his name to the Phoenicians (Odyssey 4.20).
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identification scene (96-100b), as well as another warning to
over-credulous students. Cebes complains that he does not
understand.
The metabole (100b-lOle): Socrates returns from his confession revitalized, with a renewed trust in his old principles. He
invites Cebes into his brotherhood, like Odysseus to
Alcinoos7-Socrates goes farther into his usage of comic deception, playing the simpleton, employing the Theban's own
rhetorical style of argument-augmented with l~dicrous repetitions of forms-nullifying the legitimacy of Protagoras, along
with the canon of Sophists alike (101 d-e). Ironically, taken in
by their own system, Socrates elicits from both Thebans enthusiastic concessions to the previous points of causation which
they had rejected when offered philosophically.
The anagnorisis (102b-107d): Socrates brings in Phaedo
again, this time as Telemachos, to join in the parodying of the
Theban suitors, who are now gushing and fawning over any
ridiculous fodder Socrates feels is fitting to serve up-and
Socrates sees it fitting to continually ridicule them by their own
Sophist foolishness-disguising, but never veering from, his own
philosophical standpoint. Reveling in his ironical work, Socrates
adds with a smile, "I seem to be developing an artificial style, but
the facts are surely as I say" (102d). As Socrates proceeds deeper
under the cover of explicit, antic tom-foolery, his implicit tone
becomes ever more stern, exacting: he is dangerously enraged,
looking into the face of the weak-minded system that has destined him to execution. It is in this tone, that he enters into the
figurative and literal telling of the great, explicit myth of the
speech, which functions as the ending bracket of narrative frame,
marking the completion of this present battle.
7. Odysseus left Alcinoos and his people in fear and jeopardy, beholden to an angry
god, Poseidon (Odyssq, 8.170).
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The narrative frame serves multiple purposes within the
speech. Firstly, it serves to provide a skeletal structure on which
the flesh of the arguments can rest, as illustrated in the accounts
of question and debate. In this skeletal capacity, it also serves to
highlight important actions in the dialogue: it performs the
function of the chorus in a theatrical production, providing an
impetus to communicate nuances of the dialogue to the reader,
reiterate important points, and perhaps most importantly, to furnish a strand of psychological reality to the abstracted events of
the dialogue, much like the operations of the simile worlds of the
Iliad and the Odyssey. The simileic strand flows through the narrative frame, both explicitly and implicitly. It forms and maintains the sense of time that is so important to the unconscious
and universal effects of the dialogue, which at lengths culminate,
and then disperse, into the inevitable finale of the explicit storytelling of the myth. 8
In the large/opening narrative frame (57-60) of the Phaedo,
the time surrounding Socrates' execution and leading up to
Echecrates' conversation with Phaedo, is shrouded in mystery, as
if in a deep slumber, or ensconced in a sordid past ... visitors and
definitive information are hard to come by: everything is
delayed, on hold. I,n the last lines of the opening narrative frame,
"The commissioners are taking off Socrates' chains ... and warning him that he is to die today" (5ge), time seems to be awakened, as if invoked by the telling of the myth---and true to the
mythic form, this line indicates at once where the story is, and
where it is going; in the telling, all is anticipated. 9 From this
8: The myth of the Phaedo performs the same function in this dialogue, as does the
shield of Achilles in the Iliad: it acts as a sort of sub-story; one that serves to
paraphrase the action of the dialogue in a more 'psychoIogica11y-real'-yet
mythic-way (Iliad, 18.557-18.710).
9. Bere's description of the mythic form includes the audience's foreknowledge of
the story's outcome (162).

161

point, to the end of the first Iliadic portion of the speech (88b),
time is a predatory element: it can be felt moving stealthfully,
picking up momentum and power, coming up on Socrates from
behind, and spurring him on, by the very nature of its beingforcing Socrates into the Iliadic metabole (78). It is this element
that adds to the fighting frenzy of the battles, providing the
quintessential backdrop for emoting the sensation of nameless
and impending doom that is everywhere in man's tentative world
wi thin the confines of the Iliad.
As Socrates reintroduces the image of the imprisoned aspect
of the soul in the body (82e-83), he unwittingly brings the
predatory time factor into the present-suddenly Socrates is
describing his current situation, his aristeia is suspended. As
Socrates clarifies in his resolve the imperative separation of the
philosopher's soul from the appetitive body, a shift happens
(94b-c): Socrates' fate is still as certain as Achilles', but as he lays
down his association with knowledge of "wild things,"lO and
moves fully into the realm of reason, he transforms himself from
the hero fighting for truth to the embodiment of truth moving
into realization, which in this case, is death. 'J\fter such a training [in philosophy] my dear Simmias and Cebes, the soul can
have no grounds for fearing that upon its separation from the
body it will be blown away and scattered to the winds, and so
disappear into thin air, and cease to exist altogether" (84b). This
moment marks the beginning of the Achillean-Socrates' anagnorisis, leading up to the official episode of central narrative
frame (88c-89b).
From this point on, simileic time remains as wily as
Odyssean-Socrates, proving repeatedly at turns how elusive it
can be, forever darting in and out of covers, such as the cover of
the static time frame of Socrates' personal identification scene
10. Dodds associated this knowledge with Achilles (195).
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(96-1 OOb). This scene operates as the, narrative frame separating
the Odyssean hamartia from its metabole. Back into deep disguise-purified and refresh~d-Socrates finds new insp~ration
in his old storehouse of cunning. As his antics grow more
lunatic, his edge ever-sharpening, his eyes gleam with sparks
reflected off the frontal time he has averted. When the end of the
metabole meets the narrative frame (102-102b), everyone present
feels victorious. Time billows and gushes and bubbles oblivious-until someone realizes that no one knows the reason for
the sudden giddy merriment. Something is very wrong. Socrates
here is razor-sharp; the sheep grow jittery, then apathetic-it's
dead air, time is not a,nswering the door because he is hiding in
one's pocket-and the flocks want a bed-time story. Socrates
delivers. Upon completing the coup of the explicit myth, feeling
the combined effects of his wily triumph and the ever-Iooseni1l:g
reality of physical time, Socrates quips that he can be buried,
'illlyway you like ... that is, if you can catch me and I don't slip
through your fingers" (115b).
The explicit, individual myth of this dialogue lies within the
confines of the . narrative frame, representing the stomping
grounds of histories past, and the unavoidable shackle of days to
come. It occupies the lines of (107d-114c), and in its telling
describes scenes of fire and of pain, treading murky flood waters
through endless pits of cavernous fear; the uncontrollable and
ridiculous tides of which feed relentlessly back into themselves,
gaining power and shaping the reality of the minds of men. This
is the sort of fantasti,cal description emplQy~d by Socrates in his
reI)dition of the culturally-pleasing explanation of the afterlife,
but the idea was: INSERT ANY bag-of-guts-Cretan-dog-face
pile of words you. wish, even if they might be true-because philosophy is not attainable for everyone, and without it, people
will believe anything. And while this is the case, all that remains
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are these distorted memories, that spawn and contort, and create lives of their own. They are this dialogue. They are our
mediocre reality: past, present, and future. They are the implicit
Myth that is the only standing representation ofTruth in the collective-conscience element of time. The Myth that is a myth
unto itselE
Finally, in the divinely comedic close of narrative frame
(116b-118), time has completed its projection into the future.
Socrates goes to take a bath at the hour of doom (116)-with
Crito in tow-meanwhile, his disciples are already lamenting
their feelings of being left orphaned for the rest of their lives.
This sentiment is magnified by the ring composition appearance
of Socrates' wife and children at the opening of the dialogue
(5ge-60), and again here, at the close (116b); the children's loss
of a blood father, as well as the symbolism of matrimony, are dismissed as irrelevant compared to the loss of Socrates as the figurative father of philosophy to the people and to the city. Time,
along with Socrates, has transcended into the realm of foreverin this sense, all future generations are left orphaned, hopeless.
When Socrates returns, fresh from his bath, he is presently
greeted by the prison officer-the future of Athens (116c-d).
The prison officer is guilty, and awkward in his new position,
time is in flux. Within the vertigo of the moment, the scene
breaks forth helter-skelter: the prison officer bursts into tears,
Socrates breaks into a mock cordiality, bidding the officer a fond
adieu, wondering if his poison might come "ready-prepared."
Crito is desperate for some last-minute sensual pleasures, which
of course Socrates denies him, in lieu of a last indulgence in a bit
of philosophy, combined with a demonstration of Socrates' own,
renowned drinking style-d.rinking, in this case, poison.
The chaotic smattering of time sobers a little when the
prison officer returns: he produces the poison in a ready-pre164

pared cup; he has wasted no time in orienting himself to his new
position as keeper of Athens: he is unsympathetic, remorseless,
and mechanical (117a-b). Here Socrates attributes to the prison
officer-" the man"-the role of straight-man in this increasingly vicious comedic transgression. Socrates requests permission to
pour a libation from his drink, supposing that he was probably
"bound" to pray to the gods that he may be "prosperous" in his
"removal" from the world.
Socrates drains the cup in one breath, and time goes wild
(117c): Phaedo, Crito, and Apollodorus burst out in tears, burlesquing a gang of hysterical female mourners; Phaedo is so
taken away he has to cover his face (117d). 11 Socrates, the
comedic ring-leader, scolds them erstwhile consenting to the
prodding and pinching of his lower extremities by the prison
officer, who insists that he keep dose tabs on the progress of the
poison in Socrates' bloodstream. 'When all could see by the
prison officers obvious demonstrations that Socrates was indeed
becoming cold and numb, the moment sobered: all of the preceding moments now suck back, inward, reflecting into all that
Socrates had embodied, directly back into his veins they flowed,
joining the poison in its final ascent to Socrates heart--deceasing the moment and the man. Time holds its breath. "The coldness was spreading about as far as his waist" (118), when suddenly Socrates uncovers his face and tells Crito (who has been
pleading throughout the last scene for post-monem instructions): "Crito, we ought to offer a cock to Asdepius. See to it,
and don't forget."

11. Socrates, in a rare moment outside of the city, with Phaedrus, is swept away ~th
the talk of love, and an interlude with Phaedrus (241.3). Socrates covered his
face while delivering his speech of love, so that he shouldn't, ", .. be put out by
Cjltching [Phaedrus'] eye and feeling ~hamed." Phaedo himself covered his face
(I 17d)-this aaion seems to imply a response to loving or sensual emotions.
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The always eager-to-serve Crito assured Socrates it would be
done, offering himself immediately to be of more service. All
that remained, however, was to close Socrates' fixed eyes and
open mouth. Phaedo delivered the mythic epithet by way of
eulogy to: " ... the bravest, wisest and also the most upright man"
(118).
Beye suggests the Greek word komikos could be used as an .
all-inclusive term which, may define a sense of well-being. He
quotes a phrase in epic poetry that suggests this: "In moments of
exuberance, joy, or beauty, there often appears the epic phrase,
'the whole earth laughed'" (174).
The dedication to Asclepius: a last minute embrace of the
cultural corpus, or a final jab below its belt? If it is assumed that
Socrates was sincere in his dedication to Asclepius, he would still
be a man on the verge of death, thanking the good doctor with
the long-fanged snake, for the very happy recovery, leadingaway from him-and into death, most gratefully. More likely,
this is merely the natural realization of the common comic ending, not a reversal in Socrates' philosophical stance. A comic end. ing complete with parody of the cultural corpus, drinking,
bathing, loving, burlesque--celebration of life and of sensuality12-certainly elements that, when applied with philosophy,
Socrates would not be adverse to die for. The fact that the drinking of hemlock induces erections in some men 13 proposes an
interesting consideration; one that would serve to further heighten the comedic implications of the closing dialogue.
From an overall viewpoint, the placement of Socrates' explicit myth at the end of both the tragic and me comic Homeric
portions of the speech--connected by the umbilical thread of

12. For further discussion of the qualities of comic heroes and comic theatrical endings see Beye, 181.
13. From a lecture by Lawrence Wheder, 1995.
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narrative frame-serves to bind the work in its entirety into one
overall tragedy; one overall tragic war; which, in turn, forms one
individual battle amid$t the canon of Platonic works. The prize
of war-the human soul-remains elusive: whether shackled
somewhere within the confines of the flesh, dispersing into nothingness, groaning in the underworld, or blowing gaily through
p~dise; whatever the soul's future or true nature is, one sure
aspect of its existence is well evidenced: the bloody trail of words,
corpses, and ennui which litters the history of man.
In consideration of all of these factors, and in view of
Socrates' last words here in the Phaedo-the dedication to
Asdepius-it is tempting, again, to borrow from Beye, " ... the
phallus is an instrument of self-awareness which makes the
comic hero an analogue-through the looking glass-to the
tragic hero. The hero of the comedy, like his tragic counterpart,
proceeds to awareness, in his case, an awareness that comes from
sensuality. Like the tragic hero, he must confront inevitability,
but it is in the form of an erection that has a will ~f its own'
(184). As thus, the time of this dialogue stops, there: slipping
down into the cultural corpus, forever reworked, through times,
and again.
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